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Young: Continuing an American Legacy of Racial and Cultural Injustice: A

CONTINUING AN AMERICAN LEGACY OF
RACIAL AND CULTURAL INJUSTICE:
A CRITICAL LOOK AT BONNICHSEN V. UNITED
S TA TES
By Ashley Young
- Law is embroiled in the politics of identity'

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the days the first European settlers landed on the eastern
shores of North America and began to displace the indigenous
population, Native Americans have been both culturally and
physically subjugated. This can be seen most clearly in the
acceptance of both the desecration and looting of Native American
graves as well as the trafficking in and exhibition of Native
American human remains. While every state has long had
established laws recognizing and preserving the sanctity of the
dead, allowing the removal of buried human remains solely for
limited and very important purposes, the desecration and pillaging
of Native American burial sites was allowed until 1990.2 This
double standard in the treatment of Native American human
remains and cultural objects has been one of the shameful chapters
of American history. The United States government's failure to
recognize Native Americans' right to own and control the remains
and sacred objects of their kin, both contemporary and ancestral,
dishonored Native Americans' cultures.
With the passage of the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA" or "the Act") on November 16,
1990, the United States government took a major step towards
1. Carla D. Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf" The Role of Race Ideology in
Constructing Native American Identity, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1241, 1241
(2005).
2. James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of
Imperial Archeology and American Indians, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 12 (1992).
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recognizing the rights of Native Americans to control their own
culture.' Although the enactment of NAGPRA was an important
step in recognizing and protecting Native American values, norms,
and cultural practices, the Act's impact has recently been
undermined by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bonnichsen v.
United States. Not only did the court deny the claimant tribes the
right to rebury their ancestors, but it also denied them the right to
have their culture and identity recognized as they defined it, a
common and unfortunate result of U.S.-Native legal relations.
Part II of this article will lay a foundation and provide the
historical, social, and legal context necessary to examine the
dispute over the Kennewick remains. Part III will then lay out the
basic purpose and components of NAGPRA as it pertains to
Bonnichsen. Part IV will outline the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Bonnichsen and provide a traditional account of the court's
reasoning. Part V will inquire into why the court's decision was
erroneous and will analyze the decision from the perspective of
Critical Race Theory, an unconventional and progressive analysis
that can provide insight into the historical, racial, and cultural
relationship with Native Americans. Finally, Part VI will establish
why the Ninth Circuit's decision is best understood as a reflection
of white society's continued domination, both physically and
culturally, over Native Americans and how the Critical Race
Theory perspective captures this reality where traditional legal
analysis has not.

II. BACKGROUND

Why Was NAGPRA Necessary?

A. Historicaland Social Context
Native American culture has historically been subjugated by
white culture. Over the long history of interaction between whites
of European descent and the Native populations of North America,
3. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §
3001 et seq. (2006).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2
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this subjugation has taken many forms. Despite some early
alliances and trading that occurred between European nations and
Native tribes, as the Europeans explored and settled into North
America, Native Americans have never enjoyed a fair and equal
relationship with the immigrants.4 Indeed, European colonizers
used numerous methods other than subjugation by military
conquest as one of their tools to gain control of Native Americans
and their land.
Besides the use of force, dominant society also utilized more
"legitimate" means to vanquish the Indian. One such method was
the dominant society's exercise of their control over the legal
infrastructure of the courts and the legislature to usurp Native
Americans' land, power, and culture. For example, in 1823 the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. McIntosh held that
although Indians could occupy lands within the United States, they
could not hold title to those lands.' The Court reasoned that the
Indians' "right of occupancy" was subordinate to the U.S.
government's "right of discovery."6 The doctrine of discovery
referenced by the Court had its origins in European Christianity
and was brought to the Americas in the theology and traditions of
the colonists. 7 Despite the purported separation of church and
state, the court affirmed that the subordination of Indians'
authority and integrity was directly related to their status as nonChristian "heathens. 8
Through the federal courts' sanction of the doctrine of
discovery, the U.S. government and white Americans were
authorized and encouraged to appropriate millions of acres of land
4. See S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 13 (1973).
5. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); see also Steve Newcomb, Five

Hundred Years of Injustice: The Legacy of Fifteenth Century Religious
Practices, http://ili.nativeweb.org/sdrmart.html (last visited August 21, 2007).
6. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543; see also Newcomb, supra note 5.
7. Newcomb, supra note 5. The doctrine of discovery stems from a papal

document issued by Pope Nicholas V to King Alfonso VI in 1452, in which the
Pope declared war against all non-Christians in the world and specifically
authorized and encouraged the conquest, colonization, and exploitation of them

and their territories. Id. Specifically, the edict told Christians to "capture,
vanquish, and subdue the saracens, pagans, and other enemies of Christ," to "put
them in perpetual slavery," and "to take all their possessions and property." Id.
8. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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previously owned by Native Americans.'
This doctrine also
provided legal and philosophical underpinnings for the U.S.
government's Indian Removal Policy. "
While European
descendents attempted to live with Native Americans in the
Eastern states initially, hostility grew as Native American tribes
tried to retain control over their ancestral lands. Eventually, the
white settlers' drive for more land pushed the U.S. government to
initiate a policy by which it attempted to move Native American
tribes to territory west of the Mississippi." As a result of
government-sanctioned removal treaties, the United States gained
control over three-quarters of Alabama and Florida in addition to
parts of Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Kentucky and
Mississippi. 2 After the codification of this policy in the Indian
Removal Act of 1830, Native Americans who chose to stay in the
East became citizens of the state in which they resided, essentially
replacing their Indian identity with that of their state of residence
3
in the eyes of the federal and state governments.1
In addition to the dominant culture's attempt to remove Native
Americans from their midst and appropriate their lands for their
own use, the dominant culture has also subjugated Native
Americans through their reservationist policies and efforts at
Christianization. As white settlers migrated West in search for
more land, it was soon evident that the Indian Removal Policy's
goal of relocating the Indians in order to allow them to live freely
and govern themselves would not come to fruition. President
Grant's "Peace Policy", initiated in the 1860s, called for the
relocation of Native Americans onto specifically defined parcels of

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Indian Removal: 1814-1858, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2959.
html (last visited August 21, 2007). Some Native American tribes signed
removal treaties for strategic reasons, such as appeasing the government in the

hope that they would retain some of their land or avoid the harassment of white
settlers. Id. However, the government also used coercive tactics in order to get
some treaties signed, such as negotiating with unauthorized tribal
representatives or factions of tribes and then holding the entire tribe to the
agreement. Id. Therefore, although the Indian Removal Policy purported to be
voluntary, exactly how voluntary it was is debatable.

12. Id.
13. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2
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land and the replacement of government administrators with
church officials to oversee Indian affairs and encourage the natives
to convert to Christianity. 4 The ultimate aim of Grant's policy
was to "civilize" Native Americans and ultimately prepare them to
join the dominant society as true citizens."
Through this long history of conquest, relocation, and usurpation
of authority, federal Indian policy has also deprived Native
Americans' of the right to control their culture and identity.
Although Indian policy no longer overtly attempts to civilize
Native Americans, the subordination of Indian culture and identity
continues.
B. BriefHistory of Native American Grave and Human Remains
Desecration
Since the arrival of Europeans to North America, the colonists
have found the allure of Native American remains and burial sites
irresistible. The reasons behind European interest in native bones
have varied, and some rationales were more insidious than others;
however, the end result was the same. Native graves were
desecrated, and the deceased's remains were studied and displayed
with complete disregard and disrespect for native values and
practices. It is estimated that "raiding parties have disrupted the
resting place of tens of thousands, if not millions, of Indians' 6 ,"
and now "[m]useums and universities ... hold booty consisting of
human remains and burial offerings, which stand as vivid
monuments to this legacy."' 7 In short, these practices represent
violations of the most basic human rights of both individuals and
entire cultures.
One of the most common rationales for Native American
grave desecration was the pursuit of science.
Among the
intellectuals that encouraged digging up Indian graves in the name
of science was Thomas Jefferson. 8 Jefferson even excavated an

14. Id.

15. Id.
16. 1 will use the terms Indian, American Indian, and Native American
interchangeably in this article.
17. Riding In, supra note 2, at 12.
18. Id. at 15-16.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Indian burial mount near his home at Monticello merely for the
sake of curiosity. 9 Jefferson was not even deterred by the fact the
Indians had visited the burial site less than thirty years before'."
In addition to his personal involvement in unearthing native
graves, President Jefferson initiated the Indian Removal Policy,
which displaced tens of thousands of eastern Indians, relocating
them west of the Mississippi River.2 This removal policy left
unprotected numerous burial sites on the land formerly occupied
by those tribes, and without any obstacles to impede them, whites
desecrated native graves by digging up the buried remains and
robbing the graves.22
Apart from excavating Indian graves and removing their
contents to satisfy a scientific curiosity, the mid nineteenth century
saw the emergence of the new "scientific" discipline of craniology,
which purported to study human skulls and deduce moral and
psychological traits of an entire race.23 Anthropologist Samuel
Morton, one of the leading proponents of craniology, wrote in the
1839 piece, Crania Americana, that based on his research, the
cranial capacity of white Europeans was 87 cubic inches, whereas
the cranial capacity of Africans was 78 cubic inches and that of
Native Americans was 82 cubic inches. 24

Therefore, Morton

concluded that, based on this larger brain capacity, Europeans
were more intelligent than other race. 5
Later in the nineteenth century, the federal government officially
endorsed the practice of searching for and collecting Indian
remains in the Surgeon General's Order of 1868.6 This order
directed those employed by the U.S. Army to locate and bring to
the Army Medical Museum any Indian skulls and other body
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 16.
23. See SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, CRANIA AMERICAN (1839).

24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves
Protection and RepatriationAct: Backgroundand Legislative History, 24 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992) (citing the Surgeon General Order of 1868 as reproduced
in ROBERT E. BIEDER, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN

INDIAN REMAINS 36-37 (1990) [hereinafter BEIDER REPORT]).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2

6

Young: Continuing an American Legacy of Racial and Cultural Injustice: A

2006]

RACIAL AND CULTURAL INJUSTICE

parts. 27 American museums, newly founded, also engaged in and
sponsored the disinterment of Indian graves in an attempt to find
"interesting" bones and artifacts."
Franz Boas, a notable
nineteenth century anthropologist, captured the prevailing attitude
when he commented, "it is most unpleasant work stealing bones
from graves, but what is the use, someone has to do it."29
C. Why Did Existing Law Not ProtectNative American Remains
and BurialSites?
Many Americans of European descent are no longer surprised
by the human rights violations inflicted on Native Americans by
their ancestors. Although they may not know the precise details of
the atrocities, most whites now recognize that grave robbing took
place, and in the process, Native Americans' rights and cultures
were trampled. However, many in the dominant society may not
realize that it took the federal government until 1990 to genuinely
do something about rectifying the problem of the excavation and
removal of Native American remains and other cultural items from
gravesites.
Although both European and Native American belief systems
value respect for the deceased, there was a significant gap in the
laws enacted to protect burial sites. Specifically, graves of white
European-descendents were protected from desecration while most
Native American graves were not. While some of this disparity
may have originally stemmed from notions of racial or cultural
superiority, the offensiveness of the disparity was typically not that
extreme.
Rather, because white Europeans and Europeandescendents came to dominate the cultural norms and the legal
infrastructure, their norms and practices were reflected in
legislation where those of Native Americans were not.3" Thus, state
laws tended to protect only against the desecration of marked
burials, not the unmarked burial sites often utilized by native
tribes.3 Legal protection for the deceased's remains also did not
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 40.
Id. at41.
Id. (quoting BIEDER REPORT, supra note 26, at 30).
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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contemplate burial practices unique to Native Americans, such as
scaffold, canoe or tree burials.32 Furthermore, rights to the
deceased were often limited to the next of kin, revealing the law's
failure to recognize native tribes' religious beliefs concerning the
deceased.33
Finally, the then-existing legislation refused to
account for the tribes' forced relocation away from their original
homelands and burial sites, and the government's complicity in
leaving those graves unattended and ripe for desecration.34
In fact, not only was legislation to protect Native American
burial sites conspicuously absent, the federal law that was on the
books actually worked against such protection."
The 1906
Antiquities Act granted the federal government exclusive
jurisdiction and control over any remains found on government
land.36 Furthermore, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act
(ARPA) defined Native American remains over 100 years old as
archaeological resources and granted ownership of these resources
to the U.S. government.37 Thus, with a proper ARPA permit,
archaeologists could excavate such Native American remains for
the purpose of study or public display.38
III. THE INS AND OUTS OF NAGPRA

NAGPRA is a complex piece of legislation that encompasses
two principal objectives: (1) the protection of Native American
ownership rights to items of cultural significance and to burial
sites on tribal or federal land, and (2) the repatriation of those
culturally significant items currently in the hands of federal
agencies or museums.39 The following description of NAGPRA
will focus on its first objective - the protection of ownership rights
to newly-discovered objects or remains - because it is most
relevant to a discussion of Bonnichsen.
32. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 26, at 46.

33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See American Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2006); see
also Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa-mm (2006).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1).
38. Id. § 470cc(a).
39. Riding In, supra note 2, at 32.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2
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When Native American "cultural items" are excavated or
discovered on federal or tribal land, NAGPRA provides that
ownership of those items shall be accorded to certain individuals
or groups according to a priority specified in the statute.4" Before a
discussion of these priorities can take place, however, a review of
some definitions is in order. As will be seen, NAGPRA is
constrained by its definitions of key terminology. Therefore,
particular attention must be paid to how NAGPRA's language has
been defined and interpreted. As may be inferred from the title of
the Act, NAGPRA only applies to items that are "Native
American." 4 ' The Act defines "Native American" as "of, or
relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the
United States."4 The pertinent section of NAGPRA also restricts
the ownership rights it affords to "cultural items," which the Act
defines as human remains, associated funerary objects,
unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of
cultural patrimony.43
If the discovery is found to be "Native American" and a
"cultural item," the analysis shifts to the priority ownership of the
items as specified in the Act. NAGPRA mandates that first
priority for the rights to own and control any newly discovered or
excavated remains or associated funerary objects4 4 extend to the

40. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §
3002(a) (2006).
41. Id. This section provides: "The ownership or control of Native American
cultural items which are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after
November 16, 1990, shall be (with priority given in the order listed--...." Id.
42. Id. § 3001(9).
43. Id. § 3001(3). This section also includes detailed definitions of the terms

"associated funerary objects," "unassociated funerary objects," "sacred objects,"
and "cultural patrimony:" See id.

44. "Associated funerary objects" are defined as:
.. . objects that, as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a
culture, are reasonably believed to have been placed with
individual human remains either at the time of death or later,
and both the human remains and associated funerary objects
are presently in the possession or control of a Federal agency
or museum, except that the other items exclusively made for
burial purposes or to contain human remains shall be
considered as associated funerary objects. Id. § 3001(3)(A).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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deceased's lineal descendents.45 If no lineal descendents can be
located, ownership rights are then granted to the Native American
tribe or Native Hawaiian organization on whose tribal land the
remains or items were uncovered.46
Further, if the items
discovered are not human remains or associated funerary objects,
but rather are unassociated funerary objects,47 sacred objects,48 or
objects of cultural patrimony,49 priority ownership goes directly to
the tribe." However, if the items were not discovered on tribal
land, NAGPRA grants third priority to the tribe with the "closest
cultural affiliation" with the remains or cultural item. 5 NAGPRA
defines cultural affiliation as "a relationship of shared group
identity which can be reasonably traced historically between a

45. Id. § 3002(a)(1).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(A).
47. "Unassociated funerary objects" are defined as:
...objects that, as part of the death rite or ceremony of a
culture, are reasonably believed to have been placed with
individual human remains either at the time of death or later,
where the remains are not in possession or control of the
Federal agency or museum and the objects can be identified
by a preponderance of the evidence as related to specific
individuals or families or to known human remains or, by a
preponderance of the evidence, as having been removed from
a specific burial site of an individual culturally affiliated with
a particular Indian tribe. Id. § 3001(3)(B).
48. "Sacred objects" are defined as: "specific ceremonial objects which are
needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice of
traditional Native American religions by their present day adherents." Id. §
3001(3)(C).
49. "Cultural patrimony" is defined as:
... an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural
importance central to the Native American group or culture
itself, rather than the property owned by an individual Native
American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated,
appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of
whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian tribe
or Native Hawaiian organization and such object shall have
been considered inalienable by such Native American group
at the time the object was separated from such group. Id. §
3001(3)(D).
50. Id. § 3002(a)(2)(A).
51. Id. § 3002(a)(2)(B).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2
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present day Indian tribe . . . and an identifiable earlier group. '"52

The statutory language does not necessitate an exact
correspondence between the earlier group and the modem tribe,
but merely some type of cultural relationship. To that end,
NAGPRA instructs that a cultural affiliation determination shall be
based on evidence that includes "geographical, kinship, biological,
anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral
archaeological,
traditional historical, or other relevant information or expert
opinion."53 Further, there is no indication that Congress valued any
of these types of evidence greater than the other since the statute
does not prioritize them as it does the ownership priorities.
Although the standard establishing cultural affiliation was
intended to ensure that the "claimant had some reasonable
connection to the objects," Congress recognized that establishing a
link between a modem tribe and a historical or prehistoric group
without some gaps in the record may be extremely difficult. 4
Therefore, Congress recommended using a totality of the
circumstances approach, allowing for a finding of cultural
affiliation even if certain gaps in the historical record exist.5 In
fact, a stricter definition of "cultural affiliation" contained in an
earlier version of NAGPRA was specifically abandoned. 6 That
standard would have required that "a continuity of group identity
from the earlier to the present day group" be "reasonably
establishe[d].""

Finally, NAGPRA affords a fourth priority where the Indian
Claims Commission or the Court of Claims has recognized the
federal land on which the remains were found as aboriginal land of
a particular tribe. This priority, although similar to the second
priority, does not require that the remains or artifacts be found on a
reservation.
Rather, if the tribe was never allotted reservation
land by the federal government, yet the tribe resides on what is

52. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2).

53. Id. § 3005(a)(4).
54. H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 116 (1990).

55. Id.
56.
57.
58.
59.

S. REP. No. 10 1-473, at 10 (1990).
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(c).
Id.
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recognized as aboriginal land, priority ownership of remains found
on such land will go to the inhabiting tribe.
NAGPRA's second objective, to repatriate Native American
remains and cultural items already in the hands of federal agencies
and federally funded museums follows a similar organization.
Specifically, NAGPRA mandates that these institutions prepare
detailed inventories of Native American human remains and
associated funerary objects.6" While NAGPRA also requires the
recording of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and
objects of cultural patrimony, museums need only summarize
these items and need not list them in detailed inventories.6'
Only after Native groups know what objects or remains are held
by which institutions are they able to make a claim for the return
of those items. Similar to the provision covering ownership of
newly discovered items, NAGPRA provides that Native American
human remains and associated funerary objects shall be repatriated
with first priority to the lineal descendents of the remains.6" For all
other items, and for those remains and associated funerary objects
for which a lineal descendent cannot be determined, second
priority again goes to the tribe "with the closest cultural
affiliation" to the remains or cultural item.63
Even when cultural affiliation has been established, NAGPRA
provides for two exceptions under which the museum is not
required to "expeditiously return" the human remains or associated
funerary objects. 4 The first exception recognizes the competing
interest of institutions that wish to engage in scientific study of the
remains or objects. With that in mind, NAGPRA provides that if
the item is "indispensable for completion of a specific scientific
study, the outcome of which would be of a major benefit to the
United States," the federal agency or museum may retain the items
in order to complete the study.65 These items, however, must be
repatriated no later than ninety days after study is completed.66
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 3003(a).
Id. § 3004(b).
Id. § 3005(a)(1).
Id. § 3005(a)(2).

64. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(b), (e).
65. Id. § 3005(b).
66. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2
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The second exception addresses the inevitable situation when two
or more groups can establish a cultural affiliation with the items by
a preponderance of the evidence. If such a situation arises, the
institution holding the items may retain the items until the
competing parties agree upon the disposition of the items or the
dispute is otherwise resolved.67 If the parties cannot agree on a
resolution themselves, the Review Committee can act as a
mediator, or they can take the dispute to federal court.68
IV. THE DISPUTE OVER THE KENNEWICK REMAINS

A. The Facts of Bonnichsen v. United States
While NAGPRA was enacted in 1990, the story that would
become the turning point of the legislation did not begin until
1996. In July of 1996, two college students walking along the
banks of the Columbia River near Kennewick, Washington,
stumbled upon a human skull. 69 The discovery of those remains
began the long and fateful journey into the heart and the meaning
of NAGPRA. Because the remains were found on federal land
managed by the Army Corps of Engineers, the discovery was
covered by the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and
allowed a local anthropologist, Dr. James Chatters, to obtain a
permit to further excavate the site, through which he discovered
the nearly complete skeleton belonging to the earlier discovered
skull.7" ARPA then allowed Dr. Chatters to remove the remains
for examination.7' While anthropologists originally believed the
bones to be the remains of an early European settler,72 based
67. Id. § 3005(e).
68. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 26, at 64.
69. Bonnichsen v. United States (Bonnichsen IV), 367 F.3d 864, 869 (9th
Cir. 2004).
70. Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native
American Graves Protection and RepatriationAct, and the Unresolved Issues of
Prehistoric Human Remains, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 371 (1998); see
also Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(a) (2006).
71. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 869; see also 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(a).
72. Dr. Chatters conducted the initial research that found that the
"'Kennewick Man' had a long, narrow skull, a projecting nose, receding
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primarily on the shape of the skull and other facial bones, further
study revealed that characteristics of the bones were not only
inconsistent with those of European settlers, but also inconsistent
with previously studied American Indian bone structures.73 The
anthropologists also found a stone projectile point embedded in the
upper hip bone.74 The design of this projectile point was one that
was common before the arrival of the first Europeans to the area. 75
Study of remains also included radiocarbon dating, which revealed
that the bones were between 8340 and 9200 years old, easily predating the first documented arrival of Europeans to North
America. 76 Based on this evidence, the Army Corps of Engineers
(and the claimant tribes) concluded that these remains must be
Native American.7 7 Indian tribes, therefore, opposed the study and
examination of the human remains, as it conflicted with their
religious belief that "[w]hen a body goes into the ground, it is
meant to stay there until the end of time."78 The tribes believe that
"[w]hen remains are disturbed and remain above the ground, their
spirits are at unrest . . .To put these spirits at ease, the remains
must be returned to the ground as soon as possible.79 Pursuant to
NAGPRA, five Native American tribes of the Columbia River
region, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, the Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Nez Perce
Tribe, and the Wanapum Band, jointly demanded that the remains
be turned over so that they may be immediately returned to their
BRUCE E. JOHANSEN,
TREATIES AND CONTEMPORARY

cheekbones, a high chin, and a square mandible."
ENDURING

LEGACIES:

CONTROVERSIES

NATIVE AMERICAN

286 (2004).

73. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 869. Chatters also concluded that though
"[m]any of these characteristics are definitive of modem-day Caucasoid peoples
...others ... are typical of neither race." JOHANSEN supra, note 73 at 287.
"Dental characteristics ... indicate possible relationship to the South Asian
peoples." Id.
74. Bonnichsen v. United States (Bonnichsen III), 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1120 (D. Or. 2002).
75. Id.
76. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 870.
77. Id.
78. Bonnichsen III, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (citing Joint Tribal Amici Mem.
at 4-5, Bonnichsen III, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (No. 96-1481-JE)).
79. Id. (citing Joint Tribal Amici Mem., supra note 79, at 4-5).
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proper place in the earth.8 °
The Army Corps of Engineers, then in possession of the
remains, immediately ordered a stop to DNA testing of the remains
and after an investigation determined that the remains should be
returned to the tribes for burial.8
Pursuant to NAGPRA
requirements, the Corps accordingly published a "Notice of Intent
to Repatriate Human Remains" on September 24, 1996.82 Many
scientists objected to the Corps' decision, arguing that these
remains were significant nationally and internationally because of
their extreme age and, therefore, should be studied for their
scientific value.83 The Corps, however, stood its ground and was
not swayed by the scientists' arguments. The scientists then filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
requesting an injunction to allow them to study the remains.84
While the district court denied the plaintiff scientists' injunction
motion, it also denied the Corps' motion for summary judgment.8 5
Instead, the district court remanded the case back to the Corps for
further proceedings and directed the Corps to evaluate the
evidence further and consider "whether to grant plaintiffs request
for permission to study the remains. 86 After much time and
further physical study of the remains, the Department of the
Interior (DOI) concluded that the remains were unlike any
presently existing Native American population, or any other
presently existing populations for that matter.87 The experts at the
DOI, however, did not draw from this evidence the conclusion that
these remains were therefore not ancestral to modem .Native

80. Id.
81. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 870.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. See Bonnichsen v. United States (Bonnichsen 1), 969 F. Supp. 614 (D.
Or. 1997).
85. See Bonnichsen I, 969 F. Supp. at 614; Bonnichsen v. United States,
Dept. of Army (Bonnichsen I1), 969 F. Supp. 628, 628 (D. Or. 1997).

86. Bonnichsen II, 969 F. Supp. at 645. On March 24, 1998, the Corps
entered into an agreement with the Department of the Interior ("DOI") assigning
the DOI as the lead agency to handle the case and determine the applicability of
NAGPRA. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 871.
87. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 871.
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Americans.8 8 In fact, the DOI also found that, though the remains
did not physically resemble the bone structure of modem
American Indians, they were consistent with the physical traits of
the small amount of human remains from that period that have
been found elsewhere in North America.8 9 Ultimately, however,
the DOI based its final decision on the approximated age of the
remains and their existence in the United States.9" Because the
individual's remains were found in the northwestern region of the
United States, the experts presumed that he lived in the area, and
based on the age of the remains, the individual occupied that area
long before the first documented arrival of Europeans. 9
Therefore, the DOI, in its final decision, concluded that the
remains were "Native American" within NAGPRA's definition of
the term.92
The DOI also determined that, based on a
preponderance of the evidence, the remains were culturally
affiliated with the five present-day Indian tribes requesting
possession, and awarded the remains to the coalition of the tribal
claimants.93
The plaintiffs again challenged the Secretary's decision in
district court.94 The district court found that the Secretary's
decision regarding the definition of "Native American" and
therefore the applicability of NAGPRA was arbitrary and
capricious and therefore in violation of the governing
Administrative Procedure Act.95 Thus, the district court held that
NAGPRA did not apply and, therefore, the plaintiff scientists
should be allowed to study the remains under ARPA.96 Defendant
United States and the tribal claimants appealed, bringing us to the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.9 7

88. Id. at 871-72.
89. Id. at 872.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 872.
93. Id.
94. See Bonnichsen III, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1116 (D. Or. 2002).
95. Id. at 1156.
96. Id.
97. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 864.
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B. The Ninth Circuit'sDecision

After concluding that the plaintiffs did have standing to raise
their claims, the Ninth Circuit focused the remainder of its
consideration on the applicability of NAGPRA.98 As the court
noted, NAGPRA involves a two-part analysis.9 9 First, the court
must decide whether the remains at issue are Native American
within the definition provided in the statute. 0 0 If they are Native
American, then NAGPRA applies and the inquiry turns to which
tribes are most closely affiliated with the remains.'0 ' If the
remains, however, are not Native American (within the statutory
definition), then NAGPRA does not apply at all.0 2 If NAGPRA
does not apply, ARPA applies and the claimant tribes have no
statutory claim for repatriation.'03
As previously discussed, NAGPRA applies only to remains and
Assuming no other
other items that are "Native American."
priority categories are satisfied, NAGPRA gives ownership or
control of the Native American remains to the tribe that is "most
culturally affiliated" with those remains."' 4 The Act defines
"Native American" as "of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture
that is indigenous to the United States."'0 5 Focusing its attention on
this definition, the court then set out to determine whether the
remains fit the definition of Native American. The court accepted
the fact that the remains were upwards of 8,000 years old, and that
this age predates the arrival of Europeans to North America.0 6
However, it refused to interpret the meaning of Native American
to include the remains.0 7 The basis of the court's interpretation
98. Id. at 875.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. This part of the analysis assumes that there are no "lineal descendants"
and that the remains were not found on "tribal land," as those terms are defined
by NAGPRA.
102. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 864.
103. Id.
104. Native American Graves Protection'and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §
3002(a) (2006).
105. Id. § 3001(9).
106. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 879.
107. Id.
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was the tense used in the statutorily provided definition of "Native
American". 8 More precisely, the court hinged its conclusion on
the definition's use of the word "indigenous.' 1 9 The court inferred
that Congress' use of the present tense when it defined "Native
American" as "relating to . . .a culture that is indigenous" was
intentional.' 0 The court drew from this alleged intentional use of
the present tense that in order to be "Native American" the remains
must relate to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture."'
The court attempted to buttress its conclusion by relating it to
the purpose of NAGPRA. According the Ninth Circuit's account,
two primary purposes were behind the enactment of NAGPRA: 1)
to respect the burial traditions of modem American Indians, and 2)
to protect the dignity of the human body after death. 12 The court
reasoned that "Congress's purposes would not be served by
requiring the transfer to modem American Indians of human
remains that bear no relation to them.""' 3 In support of this
purpose, the court quoted part of NAGPRA's legislative history
providing that "[flor many years, Indian tribes have attempted to
have the remains and funerary objects of their ancestors returned
to them.""' 4 The court accepted the proposition that Indians should
be able to control the disposition of the remains that "bear some
significant relationship to them.""' 5 In the court's mind, however,
this significant relationship required a biological link."16 That is, it
is clear from its analysis that the court understood the term
"ancestors" to refer only to those from whom one has biologically
descended." 7 Therefore, since the Kennewick remains were so old
that the Indian tribes could not establish such a biological
relationship, the court did not find it difficult to conclude that the
108. Id. at 875.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 875 n.16. There is no legislative history, however, on the precise
point of Congress's reasoning for defining "Native American" as it did.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 875.
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id. 879.
Id. at 877.
See Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 877.

117. See Rebecca Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native Identity: An Essay on
"Indigeneity'"and "Whiteness," 18 WASH. U.L. POL'Y 55 (2005).
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remains were not "Native American.' 18
V. WHY THE COURT GOT IT WRONG

A.

The CourtNeglected the Ultimate Purpose ofNAGPRA

While the Ninth Circuit purported to uphold the underlying
purpose of NAGPRA, it ignored and undermined the very
principles behind the legislation and the concerns that led to its
enactment. As previously stated, NAGPRA is first and foremost
human rights legislation." 9 Despite whatever compromises and
deficiencies that may have resulted from the inevitable political
wrangling that ensued in passing the legislation, NAGPRA was a
groundbreaking statute that could have been a turning point in our
perception of, and respect for, American Indian identity.
Unfortunately, Bonnichsen got in the way of such a moment.
While the push for the enactment of NAGPRA was in part an
effort to protect the remains of American Indians' genetically
determinable ancestors, the greater goal of those pushing for
NAGPRA was to provide American Indians the right and ability to
control and practice their own cultural identity. 2 ' By focusing on
the precise words and tense Congress used to define "Native
American" under NAGPRA, the Ninth Circuit's opinion hid the
invidious realities that lie behind the court's decision. That is,
behind the court's analysis lies white society's failure to respect a
cultural group's own understanding of its identity.
B. The Court'sAnalysis Reflects the CulturalHegemony of the
American Legal System
For centuries, society has defined American Indian identity
according to society's own values and norms. Throughout history,

118. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 882.
119. See Daniel K. Inouye, Repatriation: Forging New Relationships, 24
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1992).
120. See Angela M. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering
Entitlement Under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 55 (2002).
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the white-majority culture has assigned labels and images of
Indians as heathens, warriors, and noble savages. Though some of
these labels are more kind then others, they all reflect society's
history (and on-going) racist perceptions of American Indian
culture and identity. For example, upon coming into contact with
native tribes when the Puritans first immigrated to North America,
captivity narratives indicate that the Puritans saw the natives as a
test of faith to remind them of what they should not become, and
they acknowledged that God's earth was still inhabited by
"merciless [h]eathens."12 ' The merciless warrior identity of the
Indian also persisted. A description attached to a photograph of
two Squaw women at the World's Columbian Exposition in
Chicago, Illinois, in 1893 read:
[a]ny superfluity of sentiment is wasted on the
Indian. He prefers scalps to taffy, and fire-water to
He is monotonously hungry to kill
tracts.
somebody, a white man, if possible, another Indian
if the white man is happily absent. The Indian
woman, or squaw, is a shade worse in human
deviltry than the male. In the picture above
mildness, docility, kindness, loveableness, seem
impersonated. Yet the records of massacres, for
captures show that the squaw is the apotheosis of
incarnate fiendishness. These two, "Pretty Face"
and "Mary Hairy-Chin," may have never scalped,
nor built a fire around a prisoner, or flayed an
enemy alive, but that does not signify that they
would not do it if they had the chance. Serfs they
always are; friends never; companionable in the
inverse ratio of distance. They belong to no ethical
societies, dress reform clubs or art cliques; nor are
sewing bees or donation parties in their categories
of enjoyments. Savages, pure and cunning they
gave to the Midway the shadows of characters that
cannot be civilized, and the solemnity of
appearance as deceptive as the veiled claws of the
121. KATHLEEN S. FINE-DARE, GRAVE INJUSTICE: THE AMERICAN INDIAN
REPATRIATION MOVEMENT AND NAGPRA 18-19 (2002).
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While somewhat later in American history the Indian was
romanticized and looked at with more benevolence, the racism
embodied in the identities bestowed upon them continued. Indians
were put on display at world fairs. Their bones and cultural
1 23
objects were excavated, studied, and exhibited in museums.
Historically, society has created and imposed on native groups its
own understanding of what it means to be American Indian
without looking to American Indians themselves to ask how they
define themselves. Physical and cultural domination has allowed
the United States to usurp both Indian identity and cultural
property, modifying it until it fits white society's image of what
American Indians should be.
Most people today no longer view American Indians in the
negative light cast upon them by earlier generations. However, the
act of fitting the American Indian identity into the boundaries of
the society's norms still goes on today. In a discussion of "Being
Indian" in the United States, Kathleen S. Fine-Dare describes four
ways in which most Americans view Indians.124

Most often,

according to Fine-Dare, Indians are classified as a minority and
perceived as an ethnic group, just like African Americans, Asian
Americans, and Latinos. 25 This perspective "is based on the
criteria of 'racial' difference, cultural deviance from a putative
American norm, and some vague idea of demographic
percentages.' 26 Second, people think of Indians as special, based
on their historical relationship to North America and their long
struggle to create their own national identity.2 7 Fine-Dare divides
this perspective further into those that view the Indians as "noble,
innocent victims of American progress" and those that see them as
"atavistic throwbacks to a more savage, if pristine, era . ...
Third, although less common, some people view Indians as
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 30-37.
Id. at 53-54.
Id.
Id. at 53.

127. FINE-DARE, supra note 121, at 53.

128. Id.
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"deserving of whatever negative consequences their alcoholic,
gambling, neglectful, violent, marginal, and lazy lifestyles have
brought them."' 29 Those with this twisted view see Indians as a
drain on society, constantly demanding resources from the
government and then wasting whatever is given to them in their
laziness and neglect. 3 ' Finally, in addition to the above images,
"Indian" is also a legal identity, which has been molded by
centuries of federal Indian laws, policies, and practices.' 3 1 The
Indian identity as a legal concept can be seen in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, which defined three classes of people
as "Indian."'' 32 The identity of Indians, however, is not derived
soley from the Act of 1934. Rather, one must also consider the
individual tribes' authority to establish their own criteria for
membership. Further, many federal laws use the word "Indian"
without providing a definition.133 This allows the agencies charged
with administering those laws to independently decide who is an
Indian and who is not, creating the possibility that the term might
be used differently by different agencies. 34 For example, an
individual may be deemed to be an "Indian" for educational
35
benefits, but not for health benefits.
As Fine-Dare ultimately concludes, however, American Indians
are, in reality, none of the images depicted in the perspectives
above. 136 They are instead members of sovereign nations that exist
within the boundaries of the United States. Fine-Dare and other
scholars have, either implicitly or explicitly, embraced the Critical
129. Id. at 54.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The three definitions of "Indian" under the Indian Reorganization
Act are: (1) All persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction; (2) All persons who are descendants
of such members residing within the boundaries of Indian reservation (as of 1
June 1934), "regardless of blood"; and (3) All other persons "of one-half or
more Indian blood, whether or not affiliated with recognized tribe, and whether
or not they have ever resided on an Indian reservation." Id. (citations omitted).
133. FINE-DARE, supra note 121, at 55 (citing STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE
RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE BASIC AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

12-13 (2d ed. 1992)).
134. Id. (quoting PEVAR, supra note 133, at 12-13).
135. Id. (quoting PEVAR, supra note 133, at 12-13).

GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS

136. Id. at 54-55.
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Race Theory ("CRT") perspective and eschewed the notion that
' 137
American Indians are a separate "race."
1. A Primeron CriticalRace Theory
Critical race theory as a legal perspective grew out the American
post-Civil Rights Era and certain scholars' and activists'
recognition that despite the gains of the civil rights movement,
continued civil rights advancement had slowed if not stopped. "'
Some critical theorists even argue that we have slid backward,
letting much of the progress toward increased civil and human
rights slip away. 39 Specifically, critical race theory eschews, both
descriptively and normatively, the notion of a color-blind approach
to legal issues.4' Critical race theory rejects color-blindness not
because it favors any notions of racial superiority or inferiority, but
because a color-blind ideology ignores the social and historical
implications of race on today's legal, political, and economic
framework as well as the relations of individual actors. Critical
race theorists recognize that "race" is a social construction, not a
biological determinant. 4 ' Although race is socially constructed, it
is no less real. As critical race theory maintains, racism is alive
and well in America. Further, it does not exist on the fringes of
society, but rather is embedded in the very legal norms our courts,
legislators, and administrative agencies use to make, administer,
42
and enforce the law. 1
Central to traditional legal analysis is the presumption that the
law and this country's legal system are neutral.'4 3 Critical scholars
challenge this presumption on several grounds. First, courts use the
137. Seeid.
138. Isaac Moriwake, Critical Excavations: Law, Narrative, and the Debate
on Native American and Hawaiian "Cultural Property" Repatriation, 20 U.
HAW. L. REv. 261, 289-90 (1998).
139. See id.
140. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 21-22 (2001).

141. Id. at 7-8.
142. Id. at7-11.
143. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959) (arguing that "ad hoc evaluation" based on

individual outcome is "the deepest problem of our constitutionalism").
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law to screen the facts at issue.'" Courts decide which facts are
"relevant" and which are "irrelevant." This decision, however, is
inherently based on the norms valued by the dominant society and
often does not reflect the values and practices of minority cultures.
Once the "irrelevant" facts are screened out of the analysis, the
court can then come to its "objective" conclusions, thereby
affirming the false assumption of the neutrality of the American
legal system. The high value placed on objectivity and neutrality
is illustrated by traditional legal analysts' focus on the principles
of color-blindness. Colorblind analysis assumes that if we do not
consider factors of race, ethnicity or culture, the resulting laws will
be racially, ethnically, and culturally neutral. Reality, however,
belies this assumption.
The application of neutrality and
objectivity norms to the notion of colorblindness is particularly
harmful to minority groups because it deems irrelevant facts that
have a significant impact on how the law affects different people
and groups.
The norms and legal principles, that govern the rights and duties
of both the dominant and minority groups, however, are far from
neutral. Influential critical race scholar Cheryl Harris argues that
racial and cultural identity and property are interrelated, allowing
courts to use property rights' regimes to effect one's legal
identity. 45 Harris notes that whiteness is a property interest that is
valued by the courts and utilized to define our rights and duties
with respect to others.'4 6 Through courts' recognition of whiteness
as a property interest, the dominant society further subjugates non-

144. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Pleafor Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2428 (1989).
145. See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709

(1993).
146. See id. Although in common parlance, property is often used to
describe a physical thing, both modem and historical jurisprudence
contemplates property as rights in things (whether tangible or intangible), and
not the thing itself. Id. at 1724-25. James Madison viewed property as
"embrac[ing] every thing to which a man may attach value and have a right."
Id. at 1726 (citations omitted). Based on this definition, whiteness clearly
constitutes a property right. Id. "Whiteness defined the legal status of a person
as slave or free." Id. "White identity conferred tangible and economically
valuable benefits and was jealously guarded as a valued possession, allowed
only to those who met a strict standard of proof." Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2
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whites, withholding from them the privileges (i.e. rights) provided
by being white.'47
One of the ways in which the law adopts the whiteness property
right is through the "bounded, objective, and scientific definitions
of race," and its construction of whiteness as not merely race, but
race plus privilege."' 48 Specifically, the law of racial identity was
historically determined by blood. Specifically, the law attempted
to define how much "colored" blood was required to defeat a claim
of whiteness, often concluding that even one drop of non-white
blood precluded a person from being legally white.'49 Harris
pointed out that this assumption that race is blood-based is a legal
fallacy premised on several inaccuracies. 5 ' This fallacy, however,
was predicated on the racist "science" of craniology that was
popularized in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 5 ' The
scientific method on which these theories of racial identity were
based provided both the law and the courts with the objectivity
necessary to disclaim any racist motives. As Harris highlighted,
however, this assumption of blood-based race is not objective.'52
In contrast to the objectivity embraced by the jurisprudence of
the dominant society, CRT scholars argue for an increased use and
acceptance of subjectivity. Specifically, CRT advocates for the
use of "narratives." Narratives, when used by suppressed groups,
use an individual story to reveal a collective wrong.' 3 Richard
Delgado, a prominent CRT scholar, maintained that narratives are
a powerful method for creating moral and social realities, which
can vary from different perspectives.'54 Minority groups can

147. See id. at 1737-44.
148. Id. at 1737.
149. See id. While these hypodescent laws were applied more detrimentally
to African-Americans than to Native Americans, the principle was the same.
White blood was preferred and the courts utilized science to separate the white
race from other races.
150. See id. at 1739-40.
151. Harris, supra note 145, at 1739.
152. Id. at 1740.
153. Brook K. Baker, Transcending Legacies of Literacy and Transforming
the TraditionalRepertoire: CriticalDiscourse Strategiesfor Practice,23 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 491, 528-29 (1997).

154. Delgado, supra note 144, at 2415-16 (illustrating how the "reality" of an
event can change with the perspective of five different stories); see also
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utilize their own stories to illustrate their own realities in an
attempt to counter the reality posited by the dominant culture.
Delgado further argued that the stories of the dominant society are
used to construct a "shared reality in which its own superior
position is seen as natural."' 55 The dominant society accomplishes
this by selectively picking the facts that support and justify the
reality that it has chosen. 56 Only counterstories that illustrate the
differing realities of minority groups can pierce the veil of
objectivity and neutrality within the dominant society's view of
reality.
a. The Courts'Attempt to Define Native American
Identity: An Early Look at the Mashpee Indians as an
Example of What Can Go Wrong.

"We have a mystery. We have a tribe that was in
existence in 1834. What became of it? Did it go
into orbit? It's hard to kill a tribe, even legally."'57
Because Native Americans live within the dominant society - a
society that defines their identity and imposes such identities on
them - they are forced to deal with these identities in very concrete
ways.
The case of the Mashpee Wampanoag Indians of
Massachusetts illustrates the identities the dominant society has
imposed on Native Americans. The experiences of the Mashpee
Indians also reveals how the dominant society expects the Native
Americans to conform to these identities in order to receive the
rights that the dominant society has chosen to provide to them.'58
The dominant society defined the identity of the Mashpee
Indians when the federal district court in Boston denied the
Mashpee status as a Native American "tribe." This, in turn, denied
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 140, at 39-46.

155. Delgado, supra note 144, at 2412.
156. Id.
157. JACK CAMPSI, THE MASHPEE INDIANS:

TRIBE ON TRIAL

152 (1991)

(quoting Lawrence Shubow, attorney for Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council).
158. See

JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-

CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE AND ART

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2

277-346 (1988).
26

Young: Continuing an American Legacy of Racial and Cultural Injustice: A

2006]

RACIAL AND CULTURAL INJUSTICE

them standing to pursue a land claim for the land on which their
community lived.'59 In 1976, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal
Council, Inc. sued in federal court for the possession of about
16,000 acres of land taken from them in violation of the Indian
Non-Intercourse Act. 60 The Indian Non-Intercourse Act prohibits
the transfer of Native American tribal land to non-Native
Americans without the consent of Congress.' 6' Before the court
addressed the question of land ownership, however, it first had to
decide if the Mashpee plaintiffs were indeed a tribe. Defendants
argued that the Mashpee were not a tribe but simply Native
Americans (and often of mixed ethnic heritage) living in close
proximity that had assimilated into the dominant culture and no
longer existed as a separate community.'62 Therefore, according to
the defendants' reasoning, the plaintiffs had no standing to bring
such a land claim.

63

While the court's ultimate denial of the Mashpee's tribal status
meant defeat for the plaintiffs, the harshest criticism came on a
different level. The idea that a court could determine whether a
tribe existed, coupled with the racism that pervaded the trial, was
appalling."6 The very idea that a court could define the existence
of a tribe was foreign to both the Mashpee and many observers of
the trial.'65 The Mashpee themselves were shocked that their claim
was stalled at this seemingly obvious issue. They wondered why
66
the court would not believe they were who they said they were.
The Mashpee knew that they were a tribe. They had been a tribe
since before European settlement of Cape Cod and had considered
themselves a tribe ever since.'67 Now, a court was challenging this
perception of their own identity.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 277.
161. Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006).
162. CLIFFORD, supra note 158, at 294-301.
163. Id.
164. See Ming His-Sung, When Would the Indigenous be Indigenous? A
Self-Defining, Interest- Isolated, Multiculturalistic Approach to Facilitating
Recognition of the Taiwanese Ping-Pu, 5 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 4, 133-36
(2004).
165. CAMPISI, supra note 157, at 151.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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In order to determine if the Mashpee were indeed a tribe, the
court adopted the so-called "Montoya requirements," which are
externally defined factors that must be present in order to
constitute a tribe.'68 Specifically, Montoya v. United States
required that a tribe: (1) be the same or a similar race; (2) inhabit a
particular territory; (3) be a discrete community with a defined
boundary; and (4) be under one leadership.' 69 Further, the trial
judge required that the Mashpee possess all of these characteristics
continuously from 1790 until the trial in 1976, leaving no room for
gaps in the historical record or fluctuation in the character of the
tribe.' 7' This limited definition of a tribe "forces the Mashpee to
demonstrate a ridiculous fact that they have an exotic (European)
sense of tribal identity," which is "ethnically meaningless for
within-group people claiming tribal status."''
Beyond being ethnically meaningless to the Mashpee, these
Euro-centered requirements are the essence of cultural
hegemony. 7 2 As commentator Ming-Hsi Sung points out, "[t]he
axiom behind [this] [a]pproach is the forced imposition of a
conception of indigenous culture as conceived by non-Native
Americans without paying consideration to the perspectives of
Native Americans."'' 73 The court's acceptance of these factors
reflects the value the American judicial system places on objective
and neutral evidence. Further, the use of such an objectivist
approach reinforces the court's assumed role as an objective
instrument of fairness. CRT scholars, however, recognize that
one's identity is not objective and cannot be meausred by
objectivist, externally constructed elements. 74 Rather, identity is
internal and subjective. It is dynamic as groups interact and relate
to one another, especially in a reality of dominance and
subordination.
168.

75

CLIFFORD,

supra note 158, at 334.

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See His-Sung, supra note 164, at 134.
172. See id. at 134-35.
173. Id. at 135.
174. See Harris, supra note 145, at 1764-65; see also His-Sung, supra note
91, at 133-36.
175. See Harris, supra note 145, at 1764-65; see also His-Sung, supra note
91, at 135-36.
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b. A Challenge to the Legal Norms of Dominant
Society: NAGPRA Illustrates Contrasting Values in the
Hawaiian'sEfforts to Reclaim the Ki 'la 'au
In his article addressing the Hawaiian people's efforts to reclaim
the ki'i la'au'7 6 from the city of Providence (the "City"), Rhode
Island, Isaac Moriwake describes how CRT challenged the
property-law norms of dominant society and the law. Although
relatively little litigation has arisen from NAGPRA, the dispute
between the Hawaiians and the City is not atypical of Native
groups and museums all over the country dealing with issues of
repatriation. In the Providence dispute, as in most repatriation
cases, the City's claimed rights to the ki'i la'au were premised in
traditional property law norms that have existed in American and
Anglo courts for centuries. The City's formal pleadings reflected
this by using terms such as "property," "ownership," and "right of
possession."'7 7 These terms emphasize the idea of the ki'i la'au as
personal property. It further reveals a value system that only
recognizes the ki'i la'au as an object to be commodified, with little
or no cultural value.'78 Emphasizing that the ki'i la'au is merely a
piece of personal property and avoiding all reference to the item's
cultural context also reflects and reinforces the norms of
"neutrality" and "fairness" in the City's argument. These are
powerful norms that are highly valued by the American judicial
system and, therefore, had the potential to carry significant weight
with the court.
In addition to the values revealed by the pleadings, the City's
interactions with the media also provided insight into the norms
and values reflected in the City's legal argument. In an official
statement to the local news media, City's mayor, Vincent A.
Cianci, stated, "I guess I'm going to object to any pasta recipe or
any marinara sauce that they're going to make in Hawai'i."' 7 9 In a

176. "Ki'i la'au" directly translated means "wooden image." The city of
Providence argued that this object was merely a utilitarian spear rest, whereas
the Hawaiian claimants maintained the item was a ceremonial piece with
significant spiritual meaning.
177. Moriwake, supra note 138, at 290.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 292.
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separate statement, the mayor further remarked, "[i]t's not a
religious object. If it were, I imagine that they would have been
kneeling at it when they were here."' 8° These statements reflect a
complete lack of respect for the cultural and religious meaning
bestowed upon the ki'i la'au by those that created it and used it.
In contrast to the City's approach, the Hawaiian claimants
infused their statements and pleadings with the cultural and
religious significance of the ki'i la'au. The claimants, pursuant to
NAGPRA's statutory language, challenged traditional property
right norms of possession and ownership by testimony asserting:
No one had the right to trade such an item, not even
the possessor .

. .

. He was a steward, and the

appropriate thing was either to pass it on to the next
generation or to see to it that it was left in a burial
cave with the last person who used it."'
Other testimony by Hawaiian cultural practitioners presented to
the NAGPRA Review Committee also directly challenged the
legal norms embraced by society and put forth by the City.
Specifically, certain testimony provided that although the ki'i la'au
likely belonged to the warrior chief, "the relationship between the
[warier chief] and the ki'i la'au was one of interdependency and
responsibility rather than of ownership." '82 This testimony reflects
a drastically different relationship between the chief and the ki'i
la'au than the one of ownership over personal property put forward
by the City. The norms and values embodied in the Hawaiian
claimants' story, however, highlight community "ownership," and
cultural heritage. As can be seen, there is quite a divergence
between the norms and values of the dominant society and legal
infrastructure on the one side, and Hawaiians and other Native
groups on the other.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 294 (quoting John Saltzman, Hawaiian Artifact at Center of
Custody Dispute: Providence's Museum of Natural History Wants to Sell the
Spear Rest, but Native Hawaiians Say the Object Should be Returned to Them,
THE PROVIDENCE SUNDAY J., Jan. 19, 1997, at B 1).

182. Moriwake, supra note 138, at 295 (quoting Statement of Pualani
Kanaka'ole Kanahele Regarding the Significance of the Ki'i La 'au (Oct. 1996)).
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c. A CriticalRace Theory Approach to Bonnichsen: A
Revealing Glimpse Into Dominant Society Norms

CRT can also be applied to the dispute over the Kennewick
remains. The critical analysis of the Kennewick dispute differs
from that of the ki'i la'au dispute in that it goes to the heart of
NAGPRA and Native identity. The battle over the Kennewick
remains addresses not a sacred object or item of cultural
patrimony, but actual human remains. Because the items to be
repatriated were human remains and not religious or cultural
objects, the battle over definitions turned not on what is or is not a
"sacred object," but rather, what is or is not "Native American."
This dispute, therefore, called into question the very identity of
Native Americans. To be sure, the City of Providence challenged
Native Hawaiian identity in their refusal to respect Hawaiian
norms and values. However, the Bonnichsen scientists' objection
to the very definition of "Native American" struck at the core of
Native cultural identity.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Bonnichsen, therefore, is the
most lethal attack on Native American identity in recent American
jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit not only rejected the Indian
claimants' request for the remains, but also questioned whether
Native Americans were indigenous to the continent in the first
place.183 Both the court's ultimate conclusion and the language
and method of its analysis reflect the white-majority society's
norms that have dominated the law for centuries. These same
norms were asserted by the City of Providence in the ki'i la'au
dispute. However, here, the stakes are greater. Also, the Native
norms were not successful in gaining acceptance and legitimacy as
in the ki'i la'au dispute.
In contrast to the race-conscious approach advocated by critical
race theorists, the Ninth Circuit's analysis reflects the traditional
"color-blind" (and, therefore, race-oblivious) approach common in
modem American jurisprudence. As Rebecca Tsosie, a prominent
critical race theorist, points out, "[t]he court describes Kennewick
Man not by his race, ethnicity, or culture, but rather as 'one of the
most important American anthropological and archaeological

183. Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
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discoveries of the late twentieth century."' 84 This description of
the remains portrays the decedent as a piece of property rather than
the human being that he was.'85 The court, and the plaintiffscientists, commodify the remains, ignoring the cultural, religious,
and even political significance and value they hold to those tribes
that claim the deceased as an ancestor. The City of Providence
commodified the ki'i la'au in terms of dollars; the court
commodified the Kennewick remains in terms of scientific
progress.'86 Both types of commodification uphold the dominant
society's conception of property and close their eyes to contrary
indigenous norms.
The opening paragraph of the court's opinion further illustrates
the white-European perspective from which the court writes. In
setting the stage for its analysis, the court observed:
This is a case about the ancient remains of a man
who hunted and lived, or at least journeyed, in the
Columbia Plateau an estimated 8340 to 9200 years
ago, a time predating all recorded history from any
place in the world, a time before the oldest cities of
our world had been founded, a time so ancient that
the pristine and untouched land and the primitive
cultures that may have lived on it are not deeply
understood by even the most well-informed men
and women of our age.187
These opening remarks give a clear indication of the values and
viewpoint that lead to the court's ultimate conclusion.'88 First, the
court pointed out that the deceased lived in a time that predated
known writings, foreshadowing the court's later emphasis on
concrete evidence, such as scientific data. 89 Because the remains

184. Tsosie, supra note 117, at 79.

185. Id.
186. See Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 864.
187. Id. at 868.
188. See Allison M. Dussias, Kennewick Man, Kinship, and the "Dying
Race ": The Ninth Circuit's Assimilationist Assault on the Native American
Graves Protection and RepatriationAct, 84 NEB. L. REv. 55, 131 (2005).
189. Id.
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predated "recorded history," there clearly could be no "record" of
the deceased's culture by which to connect him to the tribal
claimants. This perspective, however, ignores the evidentiary
value of tribes' creation stories and their understanding of kinship
that suggest they and their ancestors have lived in the area since
the world was created. Allison M. Dussias also suggests that
"[t]his dichotomy brings to mind past government policies aimed
at 'civilizing' the 'primitive' Indian tribes ....

in which the tribes'

allegedly unsettled violent lifestyle, in contrast to the EuroAmerican agriculturists around them, was presented
as a
' 90
land."'
their
to
title
full
of
them
depriving
justification for
The court's opening description further belittled the identity of
Native Americans by portraying the land on which they lived as
"pristine" and "untouched" and contrasting such empty lands with
"the world's oldest cities."'91 From the court's perspective, clearly
no culture could have existed before the organization of the cities
the dominant society has come to recognize as the beginning of
western civilization. Therefore, the Kennewick remains embody
or reveal no culture that could be understood to bear a relationship
to the tribal claimants.
Finally, the court made its most revealing remarks when it stated
that the remains were so old that "even the most well-informed
men and women of our age" did not know which, or even whether,
people lived on the continent at that time. If the court had even
considered the tribal claimants' oral history as valued evidence, it
could not have made this statement. However, the court did not
believe the Native American tribes were "well-informed." Here,
"well-informed" translated to scientists with "scientific"
evidence.' 92 The tribes relied on oral histories to establish their
habitation of the land during the time in question, approximately
9000 years ago, and their connection with the Kennewick remains.
Because this type of evidence was not "scientific" by the court's
standards, it was deemed to be unpersuasive.193 While the court
purported to accept evidence of both genetic and cultural ancestry,
the court refused to acknowledge the validity of the cultural
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 130.
Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d at 868.
Id.
See id. at 881-82.
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evidence offered by the tribes.'94 Because of the age of the
remains and the little knowledge we have about how people may
have lived in the Columbia basin 9000 years ago, "empirical gaps
in the record preclude establishing cultural continuities and
discontinuities."' 95 Therefore, only a proven genetic relationship
would satisfy the court's evidentiary standard and provide a
sufficient connection to a present-day tribe in order to be deemed
"Native American."
Scientific evidence allowed the court to retain the fallacy that it,
and the law it interprets, are objective and neutral. After all,
science is always neutral, is it not? Unfortunately, history has
shown otherwise. The "scientific" method and hypotheses of
craniology were seen as objective and neutral, but clearly they
were not. Further, as Cheryl Harris noted, the law's attempt to
define different races has been viewed in a scientific, and
therefore, objective, light. Blood-based racial categories, however,
are more of a legal fiction than a legal fact.'96 Although the
Bonnichsen court did not explicitly enunciate a blood-based
definition of race, its demand for a genetic relationship between
present day Native Americans and any ancient remains has many
of the same perils. Like the blood-based racial definitions of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the court's search for a genetic
relationship is purportedly objective.'97 However, the court left
many questions unanswered. How strong of a genetic link would
the court require to establish Native American ancestry? Would
this standard be applied consistently? By setting these parameters
courts are, once again, creating legal definitions of race based on
the norms and values of the dominant society.
The court's search for a genetic relationship between presentday Native Americans and the Kennewick remains presupposes a
definition of Native American that is based on race. This
presumption, however, is inappropriate. As Harris illustrated, such
definitions and calculations of race are based on the legal fiction
that a certain racial purity exists.'98 Such an expectation ignores
194. Id. at 879-82.

195. Id. at 880.
196. Harris, supra note 145, at 1739.
197. Id.; see also Bonnichsen IV, 367 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2004).
198. Harris, supra note 145, at 1740.
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the realities that subordinated groups of all types face living in the
dominant society. Namely, it ignores the realities of intermarriage.
In comparison, the Mashpee court effectively denied the Mashpee
their identity in part because of significant intermarriage and
"racial mixing."' 99 As the Mashpee argued, however, Native
American identity was not determined by racial purity. 20 Rather,
tribal identity was grounded in a sense of history, community,
kinship, and Native American values. 2 '

A search for a genetic

link between the Kennewick remains and the tribal claimants,
therefore, has the potential to repeat the tragedy of Mashpee and
deny Native American ancestry due to lack of racial purity.
Though NAGPRA intended to balance the interests of Native
Americans with those of the museum and scientific communities,
the court's analysis clearly reinforced the long-standing norm of
the dominant society that science trumps culture.2 2
VI. CONCLUSION

A critical race theory approach to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Bonnichsen highlights the racism and inequalities that continue to
exist within the dominant society's relationship with Native
Americans. The traditional legal analysis of Bonnichsen, however,
does not capture this unfortunate realization. While we have made
great strides in recognizing the importance of Native Americans
individually, culturally, and historically, we clearly have not come

199. CLIFFORD, supra note 158, at 297-98, 306-07.
200. See id. at 288-346.
201. See id. at 291-93.
202. See id at 881-82. As stated by the court:
[R]eliance upon oral narratives under the circumstances
presented here is highly problematic. If the Tribal Claimants'
narratives are as old as the claimants contend, they would
have been orally conveyed through hundreds of intermediaries
over thousands of years. For ancient events, we cannot know
who first told a narrative, or the circumstances, or the identity
of the intervening links in the chain, or whether the narrative
has been altered, intentionally or otherwise, over time. The
opportunity for error increases when information is relayed
through multiple persons over time. Bonnichsen III, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 1116, 1152 (D. Or. 2002).
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far enough in such an effort. The Bonnichsen decision illustrates
that although the dominant society purports to acknowledge that
Native Americans are a unique people, both culturally and
historically worth protecting, the dominant society's jurisprudence
is inadequate.
The Ninth Circuit's decision is best understood as a reflection of
the dominant, white society's continued subjugation, both
physically and culturally, of Native Americans.
The CRT
perspective captures this reality, whereas traditional legal analysis
has not. The neutrality employed and valued by the American
legal system is a fagade. The law is not neutral. It is a reflection
of the dominant society's legal norms. As reflected in the
Mashpee trial, the ki'i la'au dispute, and the Ninth Circuit's
Bonnichsen decision, Native Americans are further subjugated by
the dominant society through the law's reflection of society's
norms. The Euro-centric values that are embedded in these norms
are alien to many minority cultures, including Native Americans.
This, unfortunately, can lead to the unjust result exemplified in
both Bonnichsen and the Mashpee trial.
There is no magical solution to rid the American legal system of
the cultural hegemony it practices over minority groups. However,
CRT's utilization of subjectivity and counterstories should be
embraced and valued as a way to reveal the hidden biases and
racist principles behind the law's alleged neutrality. While
NAGPRA was intended to serve as a human rights legislation, it
cannot fully do so if courts continue to interpret it through the lens
of the dominant society. NAPGRA will not truly reach its goal of
bringing human rights to the Native American community until the
courts recognize Native American norms, values, and identity, as
defined by Native Americans.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/2

36

